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Our economy has become
increasingly global. We import and
export more than ever before. Yet, three
facts about international financial
transactions, when taken together, pose
a puzzle. First, financial capital moves
freely across country borders, at least in
the case of the developed countries.
Returns on similar dollar-denominated
assets in different countries are very
close to each other ￿ differences in
returns have essentially been eliminated
because some investors buy and sell
assets internationally. Second, residents
of most major industrialized countries
hold most of their wealth in domestic
assets, forgoing the benefits of diversify-
ing their portfolios by including foreign
assets. A fundamental tenet of finance
o residents of different countries trade fi-
nancial assets to insure themselves against
country-specific risks? In this article, Keith
Sill examines the degree of such risk-sharing and
whether there could be further gains from increased
risk-sharing across borders.
holds that portfolios should be diversi-
fied, and presumably, such diversifica-
tion includes holding foreign stocks and
bonds. Third, domestic saving is closely
tied to domestic investment. However, if
financial capital moves freely across
borders, countries that want to invest
more than they are saving domestically
should be able to borrow from other
countries to finance investment, while
countries that have excess savings
should be able to lend those savings to
foreigners. This would mean domestic
saving and investment wouldn￿t
necessarily move together, but they are
closely linked in the data.
These facts pose a puzzle
because we would expect residents of
different countries to trade goods,
services, and financial assets in such a
way as to insure themselves against
country-specific risks that affect the
amount of goods the country produces
(output) and the amount of goods
residents can buy (consumption).
Insuring against risks is possible because
countries￿ economies do not always
move in sync: When one country is in a
recession, another may be experiencing
an expansion. So shouldn￿t the residents
of two such countries try to share some
of the risk they each face individually,
so that people in both countries can be
better off?
In this article we will discuss
some of the benefits that accrue to
residents of a country when economic
risk is shared with residents of other
countries. We will examine some of the
data on the extent of international risk-
sharing in developed and developing
countries. Those data suggest that the
amount of international risk-sharing is
rather small. This finding leads to
another question: Are there significant
unexploited gains from risk-sharing?
Though the jury is still out, that seems
unlikely for financially developed
countries. However, for developing
countries, it￿s more likely the case that





People prefer to have a
relatively steady amount of consumption
from year to year rather than wild
swings. This preference for smoothing
out fluctuations in consumption reveals
itself in the pattern of household
borrowing and saving.  Households often
borrow funds or reduce their savings
when current resources are low in order
to maintain their lifestyle.
Let￿s take a simple example.
Suppose you can choose between
consuming $20,000 of goods a year for
the next two years or consuming $10,000
this year and $30,000 next year. Most
people prefer the first plan, in which the24   Q3 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
amount of consumption is constant over
the two years.  If a household were
stuck with the second plan, it might
borrow to increase its consumption today
and repay that loan with its higher
income in the second year. That way,
the household could increase its
consumption in the first year by
forgoing some consumption in the
second year.
What else can a household
stuck with the second plan do? One
possibility is to find another household
with different consumption opportuni-
ties and trade with it.  For example,
another household may get $30,000
worth of consumption in the first year
and $10,000 in the second.  The two
households could agree to pool their
resources in each year and divide the
total down the middle. That way, each
household would get $20,000 worth of
consumption in both years.1 Each
household would be better off by
agreeing to share the ￿risk￿ of fluctuat-
ing consumption with the other, thereby
lowering, or in this case eliminating,
consumption risk.
But the world is actually much
more complicated because households
face uncertainty about their future
resources and typically make plans over
long periods ￿ indeed, over their
lifetimes. How do households share risk
in the real world? It￿s much too time
consuming and difficult to find other
households with which mutually
agreeable arrangements can be made
and enforced. One alternative is to
make such arrangements indirectly
through financial markets, for example,
by purchasing insurance. In addition,
households can purchase stocks and
bonds, which represent claims on the
assets and revenue streams of businesses
(and possibly governments, in the case
of bonds). By purchasing a stock or
bond, investors are entitled to a share of
those assets or revenues.  And it￿s all to
the better if the payoff from households￿
financial assets is high when their
income is low. That allows households to
smooth out fluctuations in the amount
of goods and services they consume over
time.  In effect, households can lower
some of the economic risk they face by
holding a portfolio of stocks and bonds;
however, the portfolio must be diversi-
fied.
Why is a diversified portfolio so
important? Different businesses face
different risks. For example, automobile
manufacturers face much more
business-cycle risk than do electric
utility companies, since buying a new
car involves discretionary spending on
the part of a consumer whereas paying
utility bills does not. It￿s much more
likely that, in a recession, households
will forgo buying a new car than forgo
the use of heating and telephone
services. Similarly, firms that produce
agricultural products or build houses are
generally more sensitive to adverse
weather conditions than are firms that
produce steel and plastic. So, an
autoworker who wants to diversify some
of the income risk he faces may do well
to purchase stocks and bonds of firms
that typically do well when the auto
sector is doing poorly. Likewise, an
agricultural worker may want to
purchase a portfolio of assets that offset
some of the bad-weather risk he faces.
In short, it is better not to keep
all your eggs in one basket ￿ as anyone
who had heavily invested in technology
stocks in 2000 can tell you. A simple
exercise will help us see how valuable
diversification can be.
We can measure the risk of
holding a stock by the volatility of its
return ￿ how much the return varies
from month to month. A statistical
measure of this risk is the standard
deviation, which quantifies the average
variability of an asset￿s return. The
higher the standard deviation, the
higher the average volatility of the
return and the bigger the swings in the
return.
To see how the standard
deviation (risk) of a portfolio of stocks
declines as the number of stocks in the
portfolio increases, let￿s look at an
experiment first undertaken by econo-
mist Eugene Fama in 1976. First,
randomly select 50 stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
Out of this sample, randomly choose one
stock, and calculate the standard
deviation of its return over a month.
That number is a measure of the risk of
a portfolio that consists of only that
stock. Next, out of the remaining 49
stocks, randomly choose another stock.
Combine that stock with the first stock
chosen to form a two-stock portfolio.
Calculate the standard deviation of that
two-stock portfolio to quantify the
portfolio￿s risk. The risk of the two-stock
portfolio should, on average, be lower
than that of the one-stock portfolio.
Next, randomly choose a third stock out
of the remaining 48, add it to the two-
stock portfolio to form a three-stock
portfolio, and calculate its standard
deviation. Proceed along these lines
until the portfolio contains all 50 stocks.
We have calculated standard
deviations in this manner using average
monthly returns from 1995 to 1999
1For our purposes here, we￿ve ignored
discounting.
Households can lower
some of the economic
risk they face by
holding a portfolio of
stocks and bonds;
however, the portfolio
must be diversified.   Business Review  Q3 2001   25 www.phil.frb.org
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(Figure 1). The figure shows that the
risk associated with the portfolio
declines fairly smoothly as the number
of stocks in the portfolio increases.
Notice, though, that once the portfolio
has 10 to 15 stocks, adding more doesn￿t
seem to decrease the risk of the portfolio
much further. This remaining risk ￿
the part not affected by holding more
NYSE stocks ￿ is called market risk.
Is there a way to lower portfolio
risk even further? Only if we can lower
the market risk. One way to lower
market risk is to hold stocks not traded
on the NYSE, in particular, stocks that
trade on foreign markets, which
represent claims on foreign assets.2
Foreign economies generally do not
move one-for-one with the U.S.
economy. When the U.S. economy is in
a recession, foreign economies might be
in expansions and vice-versa. More
generally, residents of other countries
face different types of domestic risks ￿
risks particular to those countries.
Because every resident of a given
country faces these same risks, they
cannot be shared by trading with other
domestic residents, that is, they cannot
be diversified away by internal trade. So
by trading financial assets with residents
of other countries, households can share
some of their domestic risk, thereby
lowering the risk associated with
fluctuations in consumption.
In a world where there is a lot
of international risk-sharing, fluctuations
in consumption across countries should
be very similar, and investors￿ portfolios
should include both domestic and
foreign securities. Let￿s review some of
the empirical evidence on these issues.
HOW MUCH RISK-SHARING IS
THERE ACROSS COUNTRIES?
For international risk-sharing to
occur, people must have the opportunity
to trade in goods, services, and financial
capital across countries. If the costs of
investing in foreign assets are too high
￿ for example, if investors face barriers
such as high transaction costs, tax and
tariff payments, and certain types of
capital controls ￿ domestic investors
will not find it profitable to do so. But
when barriers to international capital
flows are small, financial capital is
mobile across countries, and interna-
tional financial markets are said to be
￿open.￿ If international financial
markets are open, we might expect that
(1) investors would hold portfolios that
are diversified internationally, (2) risk-
sharing would allow fluctuations in
consumption to be smoothed out relative
to fluctuations in income, and (3)
domestic saving would not be too closely
tied to domestic investment, since
residents of countries would be free to
borrow from and lend to each other.
Indeed, simple economic models of risk-
sharing suggest that international
economic data should confirm these
predictions. However, as we will see, the
data show there is less-than-perfect
international risk-sharing.  One reason,
at least in the developed countries,
might be that the benefits of undertak-
ing further measures to reduce risk may
not outweigh the costs.
International Financial
Flows. It is difficult to get good, direct
data on how freely financial capital
flows across borders. Instead, we must
look at indirect evidence on cross-border
flows. If financial markets are open,
dollar-denominated returns on nearly
identical assets in different countries
should be nearly the same. For example,
the interest rate on large-dollar certifi-
cates of deposit sold in New York and
2Note, though, that many firms whose stocks
are listed on the NYSE have extensive foreign
operations. So, to some extent, a diversified
portfolio of NYSE stocks already embodies
some elements of international diversification.
3Eurodollars are U.S. dollars deposited in
foreign banks outside the United States or in
foreign branches of U.S. banks. There is no
exchange-rate risk in making these interest-
rate comparisons across countries because the
assets are denominated in a common
currency.26   Q3 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
the rate on London eurodollar deposits
of the same maturity should be nearly
identical.3 Many empirical studies have
examined these and other onshore-
offshore interest rate differentials.
Generally, the studies have found very
close links between onshore and
offshore money markets for financially
developed countries such as the U.S.,
the U.K., France, Italy, Germany, and
Japan.
Figure 2 plots the difference
between the interest rate on a eurodollar
deposit with a three-month maturity
and the interest rate on a three-month
U.S. certificate of deposit. Note how the
interest rate differential between the
two series has declined over time and is
now, on average, very close to zero. This
demonstrates that financial capital now
flows quite freely between the U.S. and
the London financial market.
Similarly small differentials are
found when economists analyze many
of the world￿s developed financial
markets.4 However, financial markets in
many other countries, especially less
developed ones, are not as open. Thus, it
is costly for their residents to share
economic risks with investors in other
countries.
Cross-Border Portfolio
Diversification. In financially devel-
oped countries, where capital is mobile,
one might assume that international
risk-sharing would be present and
investors￿ portfolios would be diversified
internationally. However, economic
research indicates that investor portfolios
are not highly diversified internationally,
especially those of investors in the
United States and Japan. A 1991 study
by Kenneth French and James Poterba
found that, at the end of 1989, the share
of foreign equities in total equity
holdings was 4 percent for residents of
the United States, 2 percent for
residents of Japan, and 18 percent for
residents of the United Kingdom. A
1994 study by Linda Tesar and Ingrid
Werner estimated that more than 96
percent of U.S. wealth was invested in
U.S. equity in 1991. They also found
that the fraction of the total U.S. stock
market held by Germany, Canada,
Japan, and the U.K. was below 12
percent in 1991, suggesting that
residents of those countries were not as
internationally diversified as we might
expect. Marianne Baxter and Urban
Jermann confirmed that, in 1991, over
95 percent of equities held by U.S.
investors were those of U.S. corporations.
In a 1998 paper, Linda Tesar
and Ingrid Werner provided more recent
evidence on the lack of portfolio
diversification internationally (Figure 3).
The fact that equity holdings are
disproportionately invested in domestic
equities is called the home equity bias.
The figure shows that home equity bias
is smaller for the United Kingdom and
Germany than it is for Canada and the
U.S.  Home bias is greatest for Japan.
Note that in each of the countries, the
home equity bias has been getting
smaller over time (that is, the percent of
wealth invested in foreign assets is
increasing). Nevertheless, even though
this bias appears to have lessened over
time, there is still not as much diversifi-
cation as simple financial models suggest
there should be.5
However, there are some
problems with these measures of home
equity bias. In particular, many large
domestic firms have overseas operations,
and some firms cross-list their securities
on more than one market. Thus, to
some extent, holding a well-diversified
portfolio of U.S. stocks gives investors
FIGURE 2
Onshore-Offshore Interest Differential
4Partial surveys of these studies can be found
in the article by Jeffrey Frankel and the 1986
article by Maurice Obstfeld. Obstfeld￿s 1994
study discusses more recent evidence on the
financial openness of France, Italy, Germany,
Japan, the United Kingdom, the U.S., Spain,
Portugal, Ireland, and Greece.
5Simple models of portfolio choice suggest
that optimal investment strategies involve
holding a fraction of wealth in a risk-free
asset and the remainder in the global market
portfolio. On average, from 1980 to 1988, U.S.
equities represented about 45 percent of total
global market capitalization (Tesar 1995).
Thus, the simple model predicts that U.S.
residents should have a substantial fraction of
their equity portfolios allocated to foreign
stocks.
















exposure to international developments.
Nevertheless, the consensus among
researchers studying this issue is that
residents of many countries show a
home bias in their portfolio holdings.
Fluctuations  in Consump-
tion Across Countries. Let￿s focus on
financially open countries where there
are few barriers to international capital
flows. Suppose further that asset markets
are complete, which means that
households can purchase securities that
insure them against all possible risks to
their consumption of goods and
services.6 If markets are complete and
financial markets are open, people could
help insure themselves against the
economic risks that lead to fluctuating
consumption by purchasing assets from
foreigners.
If residents of countries could
insure themselves against the economic
risks they face, the data on domestic
consumption and output would show
that consumption growth rates are more
highly correlated across countries than
are output growth rates. Why? Because
people could use financial assets to, in
effect, pool their incomes and then
divide up the shared proceeds, much as
in the simple example cited earlier. In
effect, countries that might otherwise
have low consumption and output in a
year borrow from those that have high
consumption and output in a year.7
How do the data stack up
against this hypothesis? (See Table.) To
simplify things, the table shows compari-
sons between consumption and output
in individual countries and world
consumption and output, which is used
as a common benchmark, for the period
1973 to 1992. The table reports the
correlation of individual-country
consumption with world consumption
and country output with world output.8
If there is a lot of international risk-
sharing and financial markets are nearly
complete, the correlation between an
individual country￿s consumption and
world consumption should be much
higher than the correlation between
that country￿s output growth and world
output growth. 9
The table shows that consump-
tion growth rates are not very highly
correlated and that output growth rates
are more highly correlated than
consumption growth rates ￿ not at all
what the simple model of international
risk-sharing predicts. Thus, despite the
fact that, at least among developed
countries, capital markets are well
integrated and the barriers to trade are
generally low, there does not seem to be
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*From Linda Tesar and Ingrid Werner, ￿The Internationalization of Securities Markets since
the 1987 Crash,￿ Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, Washington, DC, Brookings
Institution, 1998, reprinted with permission.
6In reality, of course, asset markets are not
complete. For example, you cannot buy an
insurance policy that pays off when you
become unemployed. But we put that aside
for the moment and concentrate on the
idealized case of complete asset markets.
7For the industrialized countries, domestic
consumption fluctuates less than domestic
output, so some risk-sharing is taking place,
at least within countries. In this section we are
concerned with cross-country comparisons, to
get some information on the extent of risk-
sharing across countries.
8Correlation is a statistical measure of co-
movement. The closer the correlation is to
one, the more closely two series move
together. When the correlation is positive,
the series move together over time. That is,
when one series is high, the other series tends
to be high, and when one series is low, the
other tends to be low.  When the correlation
is negative, the series move opposite to each
other. When the correlation is zero, the series
do not move together at all.
9In a world with complete risk-sharing,
certain economic models predict the world
supply of consumed goods should be allocated
across countries approximately in proportion
to their share of total world wealth.
Therefore, consumption growth in each
country should be identical to the growth
rate of world consumption. See the 1995
article by Linda Tesar for details.28   Q3 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Domestic Saving and
Investment. Another way that
households can smooth their consump-
tion over time is by drawing down
savings when income is low and
increasing savings when income is high.
For a country as a whole, domestic
saving and investment provide a means
whereby residents can insure themselves
against some of the economic risks they
face.
If a country could not engage
in trade with any other country,
domestic saving would have to equal
domestic investment. Under such an
economy, the only avenue available to
residents for smoothing consumption
would be saving and dissaving.10 But
access to international financial markets
breaks the link between domestic saving
and domestic investment, since savings
can be imported to finance domestic
investment or exported to find the
highest return. Thus, domestic saving
and investment need not move together
over time if financial markets are open
and capital is mobile.
In a very influential 1980
article, Martin Feldstein and Charles
Horioka provided evidence that showed
saving and investment were highly
correlated across a wide sample of
countries ￿ not what we would expect
if capital is internationally mobile
(Figure 4). The figure, which provides
some updated evidence on the
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, plots the 10-
year average of savings and investment
for a sample of 22 countries from 1981
through 1990. Each point represents the
average saving rate and average
investment rate for an individual
country. If saving and investment were
unrelated across countries, the points
would be evenly scattered about the
diagram, with no discernable pattern
visible. Instead, the figure shows a clear
positive relationship between saving and
investment for these countries: When
saving is high, investment is high; when
saving is low, investment is low. This
positive relationship between saving and
investment is not what we would have
expected in a world of open financial
markets and mobile capital.
There is a vast literature in
economics on the Feldstein-Horioka
puzzle. Many studies have verified that
saving and investment tend to be
positively correlated  both over time
within a single country and at a point in
time across countries. There is some
evidence that the saving-investment
correlation may be getting weaker over
time as financial markets become more
and more integrated. But the data also
show that investment-savings correla-
tions tend to be lower in developing
countries than in industrialized coun-
tries, which is contrary to what we
would expect if this correlation were a
strong measure of capital￿s mobility
internationally. Developing countries
tend to have a low degree of interna-
tional capital mobility, which suggests
that domestic saving and investment












United Kingdom 0.63 0.62
United States 0.52 0.68
OECD averageb,c 0.43 0.52
Developing country averageb -0.10 0.05
aCorrelation between the annual change in the log of a country￿s real per capita consumption
(output) and the annual change in the log of the rest of the world￿s per capita consumption
(output) over 1973-92. The world is defined as the 35 benchmark countries in the Penn World
Table Mark 5.6.
bAverage correlations are population-weighted averages of individual country correlations.
cExcludes Mexico.
(Source: Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff. Foundations of International Macroeconomics,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, Table 5.1, pg. 291; reprinted with permission)
10Dissaving occurs when consumption exceeds




Economic theory suggests that
there may be substantial gains from
international risk-sharing. But the
empirical evidence we reviewed above
suggests that there isn￿t as much
international risk-sharing going on as we
might expect. Does that mean there are
unexploited gains from international
risk-sharing? In the case of the devel-
oped countries, many economists think
not. For these countries, the gains from
further international risk-sharing may be
very small. But for developing countries,
which often do not have open financial
markets, the gains from international
risk-sharing may be substantial.
So why do the data not bear
out the predictions of simple models of
international risk-sharing? Because the
world is complicated. In particular, our
simple models do not fully account for
three important factors.
For one thing, financial
markets are not really complete.11 You
cannot buy insurance against all future
events, such as becoming unemployed.
The less complete financial markets are,
the less correlation of consumption there
will be across countries.
Another problem is that not all
goods are traded. For example, there is
11The fact that consumption is not fully
insured against country-specific shocks may
be a reflection of incomplete asset markets
rather than an inability or unwillingness to
trade existing assets internationally. To
examine this issue, economists have studied
the extent of risk-sharing within countries ￿
such as across states within the U.S. and
across prefectures in Japan. Generally, the
studies find that there is not complete risk-
sharing within countries but that the extent
of risk-sharing at the national level exceeds
that at the international level. See the
studies by Atkeson and Bayoumi (1992),



















































Saving and Investment Rates for Selected Industrialized Countries
1981-1990
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no international trade in haircuts, fitness
club memberships, Big Macs, or private
and government services. Nontraded
goods matter because you cannot
smooth out the consumption of those
goods by trading them with residents of
other countries. Over time, consumption
of traded goods will move in a similar
fashion across countries, but consump-
tion of nontraded goods will show
dissimilar movements. The bigger the
role nontraded goods play in total
domestic consumption, the less cross-
country correlation in total consumption
we should see.
Third, transaction costs may
prevent portfolios from being as interna-
tionally diversified as simple models of
risk-sharing predict. Developed coun-
tries afford their residents ample
opportunity to diversify risk by trading
domestic assets. If transaction costs must
be incurred in trading goods and assets
with foreign countries, it may not be
beneficial to domestic residents to try to
exploit further gains from risk-sharing,
even if the transaction costs are small. A
number of economic studies have
concluded that there is little in the way
of unexploited gains to further risk-
sharing among the developed coun-
tries.12
Linda Tesar￿s conclusions in
her 1995 study are typical. She found
that, for developed countries, the gains
from international risk-sharing are
usually less than one-half of 1 percent of
the lifetime consumption of a typical
household. Since these gains are so
small, even small transaction costs for
international trade are enough to offset
the gains. These conclusions are similar
to those reached by Maurice Obstfeld
and Kenneth Rogoff. They found that
small transaction costs can help explain
the perceived lack of international risk-
sharing.13
In addition to these three
factors, there are other channels
through which households can share
risk without using international financial
markets: international trade in goods
and services and domestic saving and
investment.
Trade in goods and services
across countries can, to some extent,
offset the need to diversify portfolios and
share risk internationally. International
trade in goods allows households to
import goods when the benefits from
consuming them are high, substituting
in part for sharing risk by trading in
international financial assets. This
substitution can happen because a
country￿s terms of trade may change in
such a way as to offset bad output
shocks.14 If a country￿s terms of trade
are high when domestic output is low, it
is relatively inexpensive to import goods
and thereby smooth consumption.
As we have seen, domestic
investment offers some scope to smooth
out fluctuations in consumption as well.
Investment allows residents of a country
to reallocate their consumption over
time. By cutting back on consumption
today and increasing saving and
investment, more consumption can take
place in the future. Similarly, by cutting
back on saving and investment today,
more consumption can be had today at
the expense of future consumption. In
this way, residents of a country can shift
consumption from the present to the
future and vice versa. The ability to
adjust saving and investment to smooth
out fluctuations in consumption lessens
the need to use international financial
markets to do the same.
Would countries experience
large gains if there was more interna-
tional risk-sharing? The answer to this
question depends on the economic
model being used. In a typical economic
model, the gains to an average con-
sumer of fully eliminating consumption
risk are usually very small. For example,
an influential study by Robert Lucas
suggested that a typical consumer would
be willing to pay only about $80 a year to
totally eliminate variability in consump-
tion. Lucas￿s results are based on some
special assumptions that have been
challenged, but many of the models that
economists have used to analyze gains
from international risk-sharing have a
structure very similar to the one Lucas
used.
Thus, in these models,
consumers aren￿t willing to pay much to
eliminate variability in consumption.
Models in which consumers care more
about lowering consumption fluctua-
tions would demonstrate bigger gains
from risk-sharing .
There are conditions, however,
12See the papers by Harold Cole and Maurice
Obstfeld; Linda Tesar (1995); Enrique
Mendoza; David Backus, Patrick Kehoe, and
Finn Kydland (1992), and Obstfeld and
Rogoff.
13In addition, individuals may not like the
risks that international stocks entail, since
they are likely to be less informed about such
stocks.
14A country￿s terms of trade can be defined as
the price of exports relative to the price of
imports.
The bigger the role nontraded goods play in
total domestic consumption, the less cross-
country correlation in total consumption we
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under which the gains from further
international risk-sharing for large
developed countries may be substantial.
Suppose that domestic investment rises
in response to expanded opportunities
for diversification, so that domestic
purchases of capital equipment rise as
investors diversify portfolios internation-
ally. Increased investment in capital
goods leads to a greater increase in the
capital stock than would otherwise be
the case and may lead to faster long-run
economic growth. Over time, the
economy could experience a large
increase in its standard of living because
of the diversification opportunities
presented by foreign markets.
In addition, although the
aggregate gains to the economy of
increased risk-sharing may be small, the
benefits perceived by individuals within
a society may be large. For example,
avoiding taxes may motivate some
individuals to trade in international
financial markets in an effort to shelter
income. Or the income variability faced
by a typical household may be much
larger than the variability of income in
the economy as a whole. So some
income groups in the economy may gain
substantially from international diversifi-
cation and risk-sharing.
For developing countries, the
gains to further risk-sharing may be
quite a bit larger than any gains
developed countries might realize from
increased international risk-sharing.
First, developing countries contribute
less to world output than developed
countries, making it less likely that their
domestic output would rise and fall with
world output. Thus, more of their
country-specific risk can be eliminated
by trading assets with residents in the
rest of the world. Second, developing
countries￿ output is often much more
variable than that of developed
countries, which means the potential
benefit from risk-sharing is greater, since
there is more scope to reduce output
volatility.
In sum, the precise magnitude
of the gains from further international
risk-sharing remains an open question.
But it seems that developing countries
are the most likely to be its strongest
beneficiaries.
SUMMARY
Residents of a country might
be better off if they could share some
economic risks with residents of other
countries, who may face different
economic risks. Sharing these risks
allows residents of both countries to
potentially smooth out the fluctuations
in consumption they might otherwise
face. However, the empirical evidence
on the correlations between interna-
tional consumption, the link between
saving and investment, and portfolio
diversification suggests that the extent
of international risk-sharing is not as32   Q3 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
great as we might at first suspect.
Perhaps, the residents of developed
countries have already shared about as
much risk as it is worthwhile for them to
do so. The costs of undertaking further
measures to reduce risk may not be
worthwhile.
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